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INTRODUCTION 
Lurking in plain sight at exits to certain United States government 
buildings are fixed checkpoints where people are detained and their 
personal belongings systematically searched before armed police of-
ficers give permission to depart the premises.  The people subjected 
to these “exit searches” have not given their consent, yet they cannot 
refuse.  These exit searches are not openly spoken about and have 
never before been comprehensively catalogued or studied; conse-
quently, no empirical data exist on their exact specifications or perva-
siveness.1  The discussion of these searches in this Essay comes from 
their relatively brief mention in a lone judicial opinion, the author’s 
personal experiences, and a single news article. Despite the apparent 
lack of transparency in these programs, and perhaps because of it, 
these programs must be carefully examined and ultimately found un-
constitutional.  In a time when the Executive Branch routinely trig-
gers concerns about privacy rights,2 discussions about the appropriate 
 
  *  Associate, O’Melveny & Myers LLP. J.D., 2012, University of Pennsylvania Law School. 
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 1 The scope of this Essay is limited to searches of the personal items of people leaving gov-
ernment property; I have titled these “exit searches.”  This Essay does not address the 
constitutionality of searches being performed on people while they are exiting the United 
States, something which has sporadically been referred to by courts as an “exit search.”  
See, e.g., United States v. Oriakhi, 57 F.3d 1290, 1295–96 (4th Cir. 1995) (noting that the 
border search exception to the Fourth Amendment “rests on the fundamental principle 
of national sovereignty”). 
 2 See, e.g., David K. Shipler, Can You Frisk a Hard Drive?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2011, at WK5 
(highlighting the practice by Customs and Border Protection officers of searching the 
computers of certain individuals entering the country despite lacking any reasonable sus-
picion); Olivia Katrandjian, Strip-Searched Grandma Says TSA Removed Her Underwear, ABC 
NEWS, Dec. 3, 2011, http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/headlines/2011/12/strip-searched-
grandma-says-tsa-removed-her-underwear/ (describing how a “mortified” octogenarian 
was forced to remove her underwear by the Transportation Security Administration after 
she refused an x-ray body scan at an airport security checkpoint); Somini Sengupta, 
Drones May Set Off a Flurry of Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2012, http://bits.blogs.
nytimes.com/2012/02/20/drones-may-set-off-a-flurry-oflawsuits/ (describing how the 
Federal Aviation Administration has approved the use of unmanned aerial drones in 
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scope of individual privacy are necessary to prevent and reverse the 
quiet erosion of Constitutional protections.3 
By its silence, Congress has tacitly approved warrantless, suspicion-
less exit searches of any person who enters a federal building, having 
delegated its authority to the Executive Branch via a broad statute 
which authorizes the Administrator of the General Services Admin-
istration (“GSA”) to “prescribe regulations that the Administrator 
considers necessary to carry out the Administrator’s functions . . . .”4  
The GSA regulations codified pursuant to this general statute state, 
“Federal agencies may, at their discretion, inspect packages, briefcas-
es and other containers in the immediate possession of visitors, em-
ployees or other persons arriving on, working at, visiting, or departing 
from Federal property.”5 
The Supreme Court has approved an exception to the Fourth 
Amendment’s general prohibition on suspicionless searches for war-
rantless administrative searches in certain contexts, often citing the 
“special needs” of government to conduct specific, limited searches.6  
Yet in virtually every case where the Court has approved a suspicion-
less search, the special need asserted was a safety or security interest; 
later cases have unequivocally declared that a safety interest is re-
quired.  No exit search identified in this Essay is used to respond to 
any real, or even perceived, safety interest.  Given these facts, the rou-
tine suspicionless search of employees and visitors departing federal 
property must be unconstitutional—a violation of their Fourth 
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and sei-
zures. 
Part I of this Essay describes, with as much precision as possible, 
the details of exit search programs as they presently exist.  Part II ex-
plains the principles underlying the Fourth Amendment’s blanket 
ban on unreasonable searches and traces the rise of the administra-
tive search exception.  It further explores how the Supreme Court 
 
United States airspace and how this is likely to lead to challenges under the Fourth 
Amendment). 
 3 Indeed, decisionmakers may well be listening to the popular and academic outcry that 
such privacy violations have engendered.  For example, the Ninth Circuit recently held 
that the government may not conduct border searches of personal computer devices 
without at least some “reasonable suspicion.”  United States v. Cotterman, No. 09-10139, 
2013 WL 856292 at *1 (9th Cir. Mar. 8, 2013) (en banc). 
 4 40 U.S.C. § 121(c) (2006). 
 5 41 C.F.R. § 102-74.370 (2011) (emphasis added). 
 6 See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653, 665 (1995) (upholding drug test-
ing of student athletes without a warrant by a school district under a “special needs” ex-
ception); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n., 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (upholding toxicologi-
cal testing of railway workers without a warrant or reasonable suspicion under a “special 
needs” exception). 
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has recently heightened its scrutiny of special needs searches, making 
plain that any constitutional administrative search must be based on a 
particularized safety interest.  Part III examines the Ninth Circuit case 
United States v. Gonzalez, the only case holding an exit search constitu-
tional, but offers a number of reasons—such as a decidedly unsympa-
thetic defendant who was caught stealing and the ineffective assis-
tance of his counsel—for the erroneous ruling.  Part IV revisits exit 
searches in light of recent Supreme Court precedent and the argu-
ments proffered in Gonzalez, and suggests these exit searches may be 
unconstitutional.  Finally, Part V discusses three potential objections 
to the assertion that exit searches are unconstitutional—lack of ex-
pectation of privacy, consent, and a hypothetical safety-justified exit 
search—and rejects each objection in turn. 
I.  DEFINITION & SCOPE OF EXIT SEARCHES 
The federal administrative regulations governing exit searches 
were codified in 2003.7  These regulations give blanket authority to 
every federal agency to conduct searches of every individual’s personal 
effects upon entering or exiting any federal property.8  Entry searches 
of both employees and visitors to government buildings have been 
approved by the courts for decades; these courts cite the safety con-
cerns associated with building entry as the constitutional justification 
for their use.9  Exit searches, on the other hand, do not enjoy the 
same historical judicial approval.10 
Although it is unclear for how long exit searches have been per-
mitted or performed,11 such searches were conducted on at least 
 
 7 Compare 41 C.F.R. § 102-74.370 (2003) (containing a specific provision for exit searches), 
with 41 C.F.R § 102-74 (2002) (failing to contain any provision specifically allowing for ex-
it searches). 
 8 41 C.F.R. § 102-74.370 (2011) (giving express authority to all federal agencies to conduct 
such searches “at their discretion”). 
 9 See, e.g., Justice v. Elrod, 832 F.2d 1048, 1050 (7th Cir. 1987) (denying appeal of motion 
to dismiss in the case of an attorney who refused to be searched before entering a court-
house, and was thus denied entry, because such a search is “constitutionally unproblemat-
ic where as here there is some reason—there needn’t be much—to expect that armed 
and dangerous people might otherwise enter”); McMorris v. Alioto, 567 F.2d 897, 899–
901 (9th Cir. 1978) (upholding entry searches instituted at a San Francisco courthouse in 
1974 because of “threats of violent acts directed at courthouses”); Downing v. Kunzig, 454 
F.2d 1230, 1231-33 (6th Cir. 1972) (finding entry searches to federal buildings—
instituted because of “bombings of federal buildings and hundreds of bomb threats”—
constitutional because of the imminent safety threat and the “minimal interfer-
ence . . . with personal freedom”). 
 10 See infra Part III (describing the history of the special needs search exception to the 
Fourth Amendment). 
 11 See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
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some federal properties at least as far back as the year 2000—three 
years prior to the passage of the GSA regulations.12  Unfortunately, 
there has been no comprehensive research completed into which 
federal agencies conduct these exit searches; however, I know from 
personal experience and research that a variety of agencies have so 
availed themselves.13 
Agencies conducting searches often post warning signs outside 
their buildings notifying those entering of the searches taking place 
inside.  Exit searches are conducted by uniformed law enforcement 
officials, rather than agency administrators.  They involve the open-
ing and physical inspection of the contents of each exiting individu-
al’s packages, briefcases, papers, and other effects being carried out 
of the building.  In certain cases, exit searches may involve an indi-
vidual again passing through a metal detector, as they did during 
their entry search.14 
The true purpose of an exit search must be to apprehend thieves 
concealing government property within their personal items; this is 
the most important feature distinguishing entry searches from exit 
searches.  Entry searches are for the limited purpose of maintaining 
safety in buildings by detecting weapons or explosives.15  On the other 
hand, exit searches cannot be for safety purposes—any safety threat is 
already dealt with through a previously-conducted entry search.  Fur-
ther, there is no attendant safety threat in the exit search context be-
cause the subjects are exiting, and are by definition not threatening 
the building. 
Another important feature distinguishing exit searches from entry 
searches is that individuals are not permitted to avoid exit searches.  
 
 12 See United States v. Gonzalez, 300 F.3d 1048, 1050 (9th Cir. 2002) (discussing the exit 
search of an employee of the McChord Air Force Base Exchange by a store detective 
which took place in the year 2000). 
 13 For example, agencies as disparate as the Bureau of Engraving and Printing (BEP) and 
the Library of Congress in Washington, D.C. conduct routine entry and exit searches of 
both employees and visitors.  I was exit-searched dozens of times at the BEP between 2010 
and 2011, and know from conversations with BEP employees that these searches continue 
to be performed in 2013. I was exit-searched at the Library of Congress in the Summer of 
2010.  As Gonzalez made clear, exit searches have, at least at some point, been conducted 
in commissaries on military bases.  Id. See also Tim Richardson, What Drives People to Steal 
Precious Books, FINANCIAL TIMES, March 6, 2009, 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/d41a83d6-09dc-11de-add8-0000779fd2ac.html. Cf. 
United States v. Kroesser, 731 F.2d 1509, 1511-12 (11th Cir. 1984) (describing employee 
theft from BEP). 
 14 This Essay will, however, focus exclusively on the exit searches of “packages, briefcases 
and other containers,” 41 C.F.R. § 102-74.370, as it is unclear whether a second pass 
through a metal detector is affirmatively implemented and approved or rather incidental 
to exiting in certain cases. 
 15 See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
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When entering a building, a person’s right to simply walk away is par-
amount to the reasonableness of the search because the entire pro-
cess is governed by individual choice.16  Exit searches have no such 
protection; once an individual has entered the government building, 
he is unable to leave that building until an exit search of their items is 
completed.17  Choice, and thus consent, is eliminated in the case of 
an exit search. 
Exit searches are systematically conducted on every departing in-
dividual.  They are not incident to a criminal investigation.  A warrant 
is never issued prior to their being performed.  Probable cause is not 
required, nor is even individualized suspicion that the subject has 
done something wrong.  In sum, these are blanket, suspicionless 
searches conducted by law enforcement officers on individuals who 
have chosen to set foot in a government building, and who have al-
ready undergone one search as a condition of entry to the building. 
II.  THE FOURTH AMENDMENT’S PROTECTIONS 
The Fourth Amendment guarantees the “right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures . . . .”18  The Amendment was designed 
largely as an answer to the abuses the Framers had observed while 
they were citizens of Great Britain, especially the exercise of the gen-
eral warrant and the nearly limitless discretion it gave government of-
ficials to conduct searches.19  This Amendment is particularly con-
cerned with consent.  That is, every person has the choice about what 
information to conceal from publicity and what to reveal.20  The 
 
 16 See United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 910–11 (9th Cir. 1973) (“airport screening 
searches are valid only if they recognize the right of a person to avoid search by electing 
not to board the aircraft”), overruled by United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955, 960–62 (9th 
Cir. 2007) (en banc) (holding that “[t]he constitutionality of an airport screening search, 
however, does not depend on consent” because that “makes little sense in a post-9/11 
world”).  Consent nevertheless does play at least some small part post-9/11, as the Court 
in Aukai noted that “all that is required [for the search to be reasonable] is the passen-
ger’s election to attempt entry into the secured area of an airport.”  Id. at 961 (footnote 
omitted). 
 17 If someone could simply refuse the exit search and leave the building, the purpose of the 
exit search would be defeated.  Anyone who wished to avoid the search to could merely 
walk away without having to undergo any search at all.  Exit searches definitionally, and 
practically, hinge on a lack of ability to withdraw from being searched. 
 18 U.S. CONST., amend. IV. 
 19 See generally Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 
547 (1999). 
 20 See, e.g., Steven L. Willborn, Consenting Employees:  Workplace Privacy and the Role of Consent, 
66 LA. L. REV. 975, 979 (2006) (“[P]rotection when consent is withheld affirms society’s 
respect for an individual’s control over central aspects of his own existence.”). 
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Fourth Amendment has nothing to say regarding information a per-
son has freely chosen to reveal; this information is not private, and 
not protected.  Regarding the things a person has elected to keep se-
creted, however, the government may search them—and in so doing 
destroy their privacy—only when the search is objectively reasonable.  
This standard of reasonableness is usually enforced by requiring the 
government to obtain a warrant upon an affidavit of probable cause 
prior to conducting a search.21 
The Fourth Amendment guarantees protection against govern-
mental intrusion into personal effects.22  The fact that a person car-
ries a closed bag in public or to work does not make the contents of 
that bag subject to a lesser expectation of privacy than if the bag were 
left at home.23  Thus, the “packages, briefcases and other containers” 
subject to exit searches under GSA regulation24 are definitionally 
Fourth Amendment concerns. 
Ensuring that these personal items are protected from unreason-
able searches does not interfere with the proper functioning of gov-
ernment or rely on the assertion of mere technicalities.  On the con-
trary, the Fourth Amendment was broadly designed to protect the 
liberty of individuals from government invasion of their private lives, 
safeguarding their privacy and security against arbitrary invasion; the-
se protections are “basic to a free society.”25  As Justice O’Connor 
wrote, “Blanket searches . . . can involve ‘thousands or millions’ of 
searches [and] ‘pos[e] a greater threat to liberty’ than do suspicion-
based ones, which ‘affec[t] one person at a time.’”26  The power to 
search carries with it “a vast potential for abuse,”27 which is precisely 
the reason that power should be as circumscribed as possible. 
 
 21 U.S. CONST., amend. IV (“[A]nd no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the persons or things to be seized.”); see also, e.g., Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 
705 (1948) (“It is a cardinal rule that, in seizing goods or articles, law enforcement agents 
must secure and use search warrants wherever reasonably practicable.”). 
 22 See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 822-23 (1982) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment pro-
vides protection to the owner of every container that conceals its contents from plain 
view.”). 
 23 See United States v. Chadwick, 433 US 1, 11 (1977) (“No less than one who locks the 
doors of his home against intruders, one who safeguards his personal possessions . . . is 
due the protection of the Fourth Amendment Warrant Clause.”). 
 24 41 C.F.R. § 102-74.370 (2011). 
 25 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 43 (1961). 
 26 Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 667 (1995) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (quot-
ing Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 365 (1987) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)). 
 27 United States v. Bulacan, 156 F.3d 963, 967 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing United States v. Soy-
land, 3 F.3d 1312, 1316 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J., dissenting)). 
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A.  The Fourth Amendment & The Administrative Search 
Exit searches fall into the category of searches that have often 
been politely termed “administrative” or “special needs” searches.  
The most obvious— and likely only—purpose of an exit search is to 
ensure that government-owned property is not stolen from federal 
buildings.28   These searches are not incident to a criminal investiga-
tion, but instead are simply rote searches of every person exiting a 
building.  Although administrative searches lack individualized suspi-
cion and are certainly devoid of probable cause, the Supreme Court 
has historically carved out an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s 
strict warrant rule specifically for them.  However, this exception has 
been subject to much stricter review by the Court over the past fifteen 
years, turning what was once a very deferential review of any “special 
need” asserted by the government into a more searching analysis, 
making the legal application of administrative searches more narrow 
than ever.29 
B.  Exception to the Warrant Requirement for Administrative Searches 
The following Part is a brief chronological review of important 
cases in which the Supreme Court approved suspicionless searches of 
individuals, homes, or personal effects between 1967 and 1997.  The 
jurisprudence begins with the most limited acceptance of this catego-
ry of searches yet culminates three decades later with near extreme 
deference to assertions by the government of “special needs” so as to 
justify the use of suspicionless searches.  The purpose of this Part is 
not to cover in great detail all of the facts of these cases; rather, it is 
designed to provide a limited overview of the Court’s slide into defer-
ence prior to a discussion in Part II.C, infra, of the tightening of its 
standard review in these cases.30 
The first case in which the Supreme Court brought administrative 
searches under Fourth Amendment scrutiny was Camara v. Municipal 
Court.31  There, the Court generally held that the administrative in-
spection of a rented apartment by a city inspector looking for viola-
 
 28  See supra note 13. 
 29 See generally Scott E. Sundby, Protecting the Citizen “Whilst He Is Quiet”:  Suspicionless Searches, 
“Special Needs” and General Warrants, 74 MISS. L.J. 501, 549 (2004) (describing how the 
Court has “moved suspicionless programs away from executive and legislative discretion 
granted to ‘petty officers’ and towards a Fourth Amendment that constrains discretion by 
the need to show suspicion of wrongdoing or by demonstrating the existence of a com-
pelling justification for dispensing with individualized suspicion”). 
 30 For a more comprehensive review of related cases, see RONALD JAY ALLEN ET AL., 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:  INVESTIGATION AND RIGHT TO COUNSEL 597-630 (2011). 
 31 387 U.S. 523, 533 (1967). 
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tions of the Housing Code was a reasonable search under the Fourth 
Amendment, by “balancing the need to search against the invasion 
which the search entails.”32  Informing the government interest side 
of the balancing test was the fact that “the public interest demands 
that all dangerous conditions be prevented or abated, yet it is doubt-
ful that any other canvassing technique would achieve acceptable re-
sults.”33  Although it held that these types of searches are reasonable, 
the Court required that an administrative warrant34 be obtained by 
the housing inspector before the state could trump a person’s refusal 
of access to his private residence.35  It is important to note that the 
governmental need making this search reasonable was a safety con-
cern—the prevention and abatement of dangerous conditions. 
Applying the framework announced in Camara, the Court over the 
next thirty years developed a jurisprudence that found reasonable 
every assertion of a governmental interest in an administrative search 
case. In United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, the Court approved suspicion-
less border searches of motor vehicles for illegal aliens by way of a 
fixed roadside checkpoint.36  In this case the Court discarded the ad-
ministrative warrant requirement that was held so important in Cama-
ra.37  However, the Court purported to limit Martinez-Fuerte to its 
facts—permitting only short stops for questioning at fixed border 
checkpoints without a warrant or individualized suspicion.38 
The Court did not stop at border checkpoints, however, despite 
Martinez-Fuerte allegedly being confined to its facts.  Just three years 
later in Bell v. Wolfish, the Court upheld body cavity searches without 
individualized suspicion of prison inmates who had recent contact 
 
 32 Id. at 536-37. 
 33 Id. at 537. 
 34 Unlike a traditional warrant, this special administrative warrant required no probable 
cause or individualized suspicion. Id. at 532.  It instead was an official document that af-
forded the person whose house was being searched a “way of knowing whether enforce-
ment of the municipal code involved requires inspection of his premises . . . of knowing 
the lawful limits of the inspector’s power to search, and . . . of knowing whether the in-
spector himself is acting under proper authorization.”  Id. 
 35 Id. at 539-40 (“[W]e therefore conclude that appellant had a constitutional right to insist 
that the inspectors obtain a warrant to search and that appellant may not constitutionally 
be convicted for refusing to consent to the inspection.”). 
 36 428 U.S. 543, 566 (1976). 
 37 Id. at 564-65. 
  We do not think . . . that Camara is an apt model.  It involved the search of private residences, 
for which a warrant traditionally has been required. . . . The degree of intrusion upon privacy 
that may be occasioned by the search of a house hardly can be compared with the minor inter-
ference with privacy resulting from the mere stop for questioning as to residence. 
 38 Id. at 567 (“We have held that checkpoint searches are constitutional only if justified by 
consent or probable cause to search. And our holding today is limited to the type of stops 
[border checkpoint stops] described in this opinion.”) (citation omitted). 
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with non-inmates, citing the safety concerns associated with the 
uniquely dangerous environment present in prison.39  The growing 
spiral into deference had begun. 
Six years later, in T.L.O., the Court crafted a new, overarching 
phrase to describe these searches:  “special needs” searches.40 The 
Court approved a warrantless search performed by a school principal 
of a student who was suspected of possessing drugs.41  Unlike Martinez-
Fuerte or Wolfish, the school administrator did have individualized sus-
picion, although he did not have a warrant or probable cause.42  The 
Court explained that strict adherence to the probable cause require-
ment in a school setting was not necessary, and pointed out that ad-
ministrators have the special need “to maintain order” in school 
while they stand in loco parentis—a safety interest.43 
Two terms later, in O’Connor v. Ortega, a plurality of the Court ap-
proved the special-needs-based administrative search of a state em-
ployee’s desk and file cabinet for evidence of wrongdoing.44  This case 
will be returned to at much greater detail later in this Essay.45 
The Court in New York v. Burger approved the warrantless search of 
an automobile junkyard, citing the safety concerns associated with a 
highly regulated industry.46  Later, in the companion cases of Skinner 
and Von Raab, the Court extended this line of special needs jurispru-
dence to allow drug testing of employees whose drug use might pose 
a public safety concern. In Skinner the concern had been proven in 
the record,47 but in Von Raab the safety interest was merely specula-
tive.48 
The 1990 case Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz approved 
drunk driving checkpoints without a warrant or individualized suspi-
cion, based on the safety interest associated with maintaining safe 
roads free of intoxicated drivers.49  This case was clarified and limited 
 
 39 441 U.S. 520, 558-60 (1979). 
 40 New Jersey v. T.L.O, 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (“Only in those 
exceptional circumstances in which special needs, beyond the normal need for law en-
forcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable, is a court 
entitled to substitute its balancing of interests for that of the Framers.”). 
 41 Id. at 346-48. 
 42 Id. at 345-46. 
 43 Id. at 341. 
 44 O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 725 (1987) (plurality opinion). 
 45 See Part V.A, infra. 
 46 482 U.S. 691, 693, 703 (1987). 
 47 489 U.S at 628. 
 48 Nat’l Treasury Emps.’ Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 684 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(discussing his move from the majority in Skinner to the dissent here in Von Raab, because 
of a dearth of “well-known or well-demonstrated evils” presented in the facts of Von Raab, 
in marked contrast with Skinner). 
 49 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990). 
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later in City of Indianapolis v. Edmond,50 a case discussed in the next 
Part. 
The last major case expanding the special needs jurisprudence 
was Vernonia School District v. Acton, which approved the drug testing 
of high school student athletes without individualized suspicion or 
probable cause.51  This was a departure even from T.L.O., discussed 
supra, in which the school principal did have individualized suspicion 
of the student who was searched.52  The Court in Acton discussed the 
fact that school officials stand in loco parentis to minor children at 
school,53 as in T.L.O., and that instead of searching an entire school, 
the program was “directed more narrowly to drug use by school ath-
letes, where the risk of immediate physical harm to the drug user or 
those with whom he is playing his sport is particularly high.”54 
Acton, decided in 1995, was the last case in which the Court was 
deferential to government in evaluating a claim of special needs to 
justify a search.  The opinion served to open up all manner of stu-
dents to drug testing without individualized suspicion even though 
the articulated safety interest was arguably much more attenuated 
than in any of the past special needs cases just discussed.  Perhaps 
understanding this deference to be spiraling into a serious problem, 
the Court did an about-face and began to significantly contract this 
line of reasoning.55 
C.  Contraction of the Administrative Search Exception 
The Court began the diminution of this near-complete deference 
when it decided Chandler v. Miller in 1997.56  There, the Court struck 
down a Georgia law that required all candidates for public office—
despite a lack of evidence of illegal drug use by any of those candi-
dates—to submit to warrantless, suspicionless drug tests.  Such a 
search regime, the Court held, was not staked on any legitimate spe-
cial need, but was merely symbolic.57  The Court began its opinion by 
reaffirming the general precept that searches are ordinarily unrea-
 
 50 531 U.S. 32, 39 (2000). 
 51 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995). 
 52 See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
 53 515 U.S. at 654-55. 
 54 Id. at 661-62. 
 55 See Sundby, supra note 30, at 515 (describing the recognition by the Court that its former 
special needs jurisprudence created the specter of a return to the vices of the general 
warrant, and its initial reaction to this problem in Chandler v. Miller). 
 56 520 U.S. 305 (1997). 
 57 Id. at 322 (“The need revealed, in short, is symbolic, not ‘special,’ as that term draws 
meaning from our case law.”). 
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sonable without at least some measure of individualized suspicion.58  
Particularly important in this case is the Court’s reiteration of a per-
vasive theme from the earlier, pre-contraction cases:  “[W]here the 
risk to public safety is substantial and real, blanket suspicionless 
searches calibrated to the risk may rank as ‘reasonable’—for exam-
ple, searches now routine at airports and at entrances to courts and 
other official buildings.”59  The Court continued, “But 
where . . . public safety is not genuinely in jeopardy, the Fourth 
Amendment precludes the suspicionless search, no matter how con-
veniently arranged.”60  Arguably faced with the consequences of its 
deferential jurisprudence—a suspicionless search regime foisted on 
candidates for elective office despite lacking evidence of drug 
abuse—the Chandler Court heightened its scrutiny and began to re-
strict the scope of the earlier cases. 
Not wavering from its Chandler reasoning, the Court in City of Indi-
anapolis v. Edmond struck down a random narcotics checkpoint,61 one 
that the district court had upheld relying on reasoning of Sitz and 
Martinez-Fuerte.62  In Edmond, the Court made even more explicit the 
new, searching analysis it applies to assertions by government agen-
cies of “special needs” allowing them to conduct suspicionless search-
es without offending the Constitution.  The Court held that every 
suspicionless search must be carefully scrutinized by the judiciary to 
ensure that the primary purpose of the search is not a bad faith “pre-
text for gathering evidence of violations of the penal laws.”63  Analyz-
ing the precedent of Martinez-Fuerte and Sitz, and holding them to  
their facts, the majority cited the “considerations specially related to 
the need to police the border”64 and the “imperative of highway safe-
ty”65 as the safety-based special needs present in those two cases.  How-
ever, the Court held that the narcotics checkpoint in Edmond was 
 
 58 Id. at 308. 
 59 Id. at 323 (emphasis added).  It is crucial to note that the Court describes entry searches at 
public buildings and airports as motivated by public safety concerns and thus eminently 
reasonable.  However, it noticeably fails to mention exit searches. 
 60 Id. 
 61 City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000). 
 62 See Edmond v. Goldsmith, 38 F. Supp. 2d 1016 (S.D. Ind. 1998). 
 63 Edmond, 531 U.S. at 45.  This subjective evaluation of the government’s motives stands in 
direct contrast with judicial evaluation of every other kind of search under the Fourth 
Amendment, where only objective evaluations of reasonableness are permitted.  See Whren 
v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 811 (1996) (“But only an undiscerning reader would re-
gard these [suspicionless search] cases  as endorsing the principle that ulterior motives 
can invalidate police conduct that is justifiable on the basis of probable cause to believe 
that a violation of law has occurred.”). 
 64 Edmond, 531 U.S. at 38. 
 65 Id. at 39. 
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starkly different; its primary purpose was the advancement of “the 
general interest in crime control,”66 therefore making it unconstitu-
tional.  Where a search involves law enforcement and the pursuit of 
crime control, individualized suspicion is an irreducible component.67  
The Court did clarify that its holding did not overrule Sitz or Martinez-
Fuerte, however, but confirmed that these two holdings are limited to 
allowing suspicionless searches only when public safety is genuinely at 
issue.68 
Finally, in Ferguson v. City of Charleston, the Court extended the 
reasoning of Chandler and Edmond to strike down a hospital-based, 
suspicionless program of drug-testing pregnant women, where those 
who tested positive were reported to law enforcement officials as 
criminal suspects.69  Although the Court left open the possibility that 
such searches would not be unreasonable had the subjects consent-
ed,70 it essentially ignored the issue in its analysis and assumed that no 
informed consent was given.71  Given that posture, the Court smooth-
ly dispensed with the government’s asserted special need of medical 
health concerns, holding that such searches do not rise to the level of 
reasonableness required to permit a suspicionless search.  The gov-
ernment’s stated purpose was “ultimately indistinguishable from the 
general interest in crime control”72 as the “immediate objective of the 
searches was for general evidence for law enforcement purposes.”73  Par-
amount to this holding was the fact that at least the threat of law en-
forcement involvement was present:  “In other special needs cases, we 
have tolerated suspension of the Fourth Amendment’s warrant or 
 
 66 Id. at 44 (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659 n.18 (1979)). 
 67 Id. at 47 (“When law enforcement authorities pursue primarily general crime control 
purposes at checkpoints such as here, however, stops can only be justified by some quan-
tum of individualized suspicion.”). 
 68 Id. at 47-48 (“Our holding also does not affect the validity of border searches or searches 
at places like airports and government buildings, where the need for such measures to 
ensure public safety can be particularly acute.”). 
 69 Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S 67, 69-72 (2001) (noting that those testing posi-
tive faced potential charges of simple possession, possession and distribution to a person 
under the age of 18, or unlawful neglect of a child). 
 70 Id. at 69-70. 
 71 Id. at 76 (“[W]e necessarily assume for the purpose of our decision . . . that the searches 
were conducted without the informed consent of the patients.”).  Even on remand from 
the Supreme Court to consider consent, the Fourth Circuit held that consent was not 
present in the case.  See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 308 F.3d 380, 386 (4th Cir. 2002) 
(“[N]o rational jury could conclude . . . that the Appellants gave their informed consent 
to the taking and testing of their urine for evidence of criminal activity for law enforce-
ment purposes.”). 
 72 Id. at 81 (quoting City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 40 (2000) (quotation 
marks omitted)). 
 73 Id. at 83. 
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probable cause requirement in part because there was no law en-
forcement purpose behind the searches in those cases, and there was 
little, if any, entanglement with law enforcement.”74 
Thus, the Court has significantly heightened its scrutiny when the 
government asserts a special needs justification for conducting war-
rantless, suspicionless searches.75  Although the special needs claims 
approved in the pre-1997 cases often had only an attenuated relation 
to safety, the Court has since made explicit that a special needs 
search must have a safety interest at stake.  Further, the Court has 
made clear that a legitimate safety interest must be apparent, not fab-
ricated, and certainly not a pretext for law enforcement officers to 
enforce the penal laws.  Moreover, the involvement of law enforce-
ment with any suspicionless search regime makes it instantly suspect 
and subject to heightened judicial scrutiny.  Any suspicionless search 
that fails this strict, non-deferential analysis is an unconstitutional vio-
lation of the subject’s Fourth Amendment rights. 
III.  PRIOR APPLICATION OF THE WARRANT EXCEPTION TO EXIT 
SEARCHES 
Only one case has ever explicitly dealt with the issue of the consti-
tutionality of an exit search.  In that case, the Ninth Circuit found 
constitutional the exit search with which it was presented.76 
A.  United States v. Gonzalez 
The Ninth Circuit dealt with this matter as one of first impression.  
Unaided by both litigants—who proved unable to cite much, if any, 
relevant case law in their briefs—the court was unable to uncover of 
its own accord anything directly on point.77  The case was not ap-
pealed to the Supreme Court, and so the Court has never been pre-
 
 74 Id. at 79 n. 15 (citing Skinner, Von Raab, and Acton). 
 75 The Court has not struck down every search justified by special needs since 1997.  For ex-
ample, in Illinois v. Lidster, the Court found reasonable a “highway checkpoint where po-
lice stopped motorists to ask them for information about a recent hit-and-run accident.”  
540 U.S. 419, 421 (2004).  Despite applying the heightened scrutiny afforded suspicion-
less searches found Chandler, Edmond, and Ferguson, the Court found the search in Lidster 
reasonable because its primary purpose was not general crime control, and it was de-
signed to elicit information about people who were not stopped at the checkpoint.  Id. at 
423.  Furthermore, public safety was at issue in that the police were searching for the spe-
cific perpetrator of a violent crime.  Id. at 427. 
 76 United States v. Gonzalez, 300 F.3d 1048, 1055 (9th Cir. 2002) (“This search was reasona-
ble.”). 
 77 Id. at 1052 (“Oddly, neither Gonzalez nor the government cites any authority in point on 
government employer random theft searches of employees’ closed containers, and we 
have found none.”). 
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sented with the opportunity to consider the merits of exit searches di-
rectly. 
The facts of Gonzalez are relatively straightforward.  Gonzalez was 
an employee of the McChord Air Force Base Exchange, a military 
department store near Tacoma, Washington.78  While Gonzalez was a 
government employee, 79 he was not a member of the military (mili-
tary exchanges are operated by a civilian Department of Defense 
Agency called the Army and Air Force Exchange Service).80  Gonzalez 
had previously signed a form stating that he consented to being 
searched as a condition of employment, although the opinion did 
not provide the exact language of the agreement.81  One day, Gonza-
lez was randomly exit-searched as he was leaving work by a “store de-
tective”82 who did not have a warrant, probable cause, or even indi-
vidualized suspicion.83  The sole purpose of the search was “to deter 
and apprehend theft by employees.”84 
This search turned up four packages of spark plugs priced at 
$3.75 each ($15 total), which Gonzalez had attempted to steal by 
concealing them in his closed, personal backpack.85  In pretrial mo-
tions before the district court, and on appeal, Gonzalez alleged that 
this exit search was a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights; he 
further alleged that any consent he had allegedly given to be 
searched was invalid.86 
The court began its analysis by ignoring the issue of consent, tacit-
ly admitting its unimportance to the analysis.87  The court then con-
 
 78 Id. at 1050. 
 79 Id. 
 80 See AAFES, About Exchange, available at http://www.shopmyexchange.com/
aboutexchange/. 
 81 Id. at 1052 (“Mr. Gonzalez signed or initialed some sort of paper when he started work 
that indicated his understanding that belongings such as his backpack might be inspect-
ed, but the government did not submit the paper as evidence, so we don’t know what it 
says.”).  Despite the insufficiency of the government’s evidence, Gonzalez’s counsel con-
ceded the point as well.  Id. (“Nevertheless, Mr. Gonzalez concedes that he signed or ini-
tialed some such paper when he commenced work at the base exchange, that he knew 
such random searches were store policy, and that he allowed the search of the backpack 
because and only because he felt he had no choice.”). 
 82 United States v. Gonzalez, 300 F.3d 1048, 1050 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 83 Id. at 1051. 
 84 Id.  Moreover, the court continued, “Here there was no individualized suspicion, and the 
government interest for which the search was instituted was merely prevention of em-
ployee theft, as opposed to preserving human life and safety or national security.”  Id. at 
1052. 
 85 Id. at 1050, n.2. 
 86 Id. at 1051-52. 
 87 United States v. Gonzalez, 300 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2002) (“We do not reach the is-
sue of whether Mr. Gonzalez consented to the search, or whether there was anything de-
fective about his consent.”).  See also Part V.A.1, infra (discussing how judicial restraint 
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tinued on to the constitutional issue of the individualized suspicion 
requirement and found that the search was reasonable, despite the 
lack of individualized suspicion or probable cause.88  Although the 
court initially considered language from O’Connor in formulating 
analysis, which specifically states, “[t]he appropriate standard for a 
workplace search does not necessarily apply to a piece of closed per-
sonal luggage,”89 the court ultimately rejected it and found the exit 
search “reasonable under the circumstances.”90  In reaching this con-
clusion, the court cited only T.L.O.91 and its own case, United States v. 
Bulacan,92 for support, both of which the court admitted were “distin-
guishable.”93  T.L.O. considered the search of a high school student 
by a school administrator who stood in loco parentis and who had in-
dividualized suspicion of wrongdoing.94  Bulacan involved an entry 
search to a government building designed specifically for the purpose 
of dealing with security threats.95  Despite the stark disparity between 
these cases and the facts of Gonzalez, and the existence of the contrary 
cases of Chandler, Edmond, and Ferguson,96 the court nevertheless 
found the exit search of Gonzalez reasonable—substituting its own 
sensibilities regarding how to run a business for sound legal judg-
ment provided by following Supreme Court precedent.97 
B.  Explication of the Ninth Circuit’s Ruling in Gonzalez 
A combination of factors created the perfect storm that produced 
the puzzling ruling in Gonzalez.  The first and perhaps most important 
issue is that Gonzalez was a particularly unsympathetic defendant.  
The initial discussion in the opinion dealt with the government’s ar-
 
principles require that cases be resolved on the non-constitutional issue whenever possi-
ble). 
 88 Gonzalez, 300 F.3d. at 1055. 
 89 Id. at 1053 (quoting O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 716 (1987)) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
 90 Id. (quoting Ortega v. O’Connor, 146 F.3d 1149, 1158 (9th Cir. 1998)) (internal quota-
tions omitted). 
 91 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985); see also Part II.B, supra. 
 92 156 F.3d 963, 964 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 93 Gonzalez, 300 F.3d at 1053 (“In Bulacan, the search was of a woman’s handbag as she came 
into a government building.  The search was for security threats to those in the building, 
not for things stolen from the building.”) (citing Bulacan, 156 F.3d at 966) (footnote 
omitted). 
 94 See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
 95 Gonzalez, 300 F.3d at 1053-54 (“In Bulacan, the justification for the search was protection 
of the people in the building from explosives and weapons . . . .”). 
 96 See Part II.C, supra.  None of these cases were considered by the court in its Gonzalez opin-
ion. 
 97 Gonzalez, 300 F.3d at 1054 (“It’s hard to run a store if the employees walk out with the 
inventory.”). 
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gument that Gonzalez had been a fugitive from the law, or at least 
had not complied with the conditions of the sentenced probation 
pursuant to his conviction.98  Further, from the outset, the court was 
“dismay[ed]” that this case should ever have reached its bench.99 
Concerning the court’s marked lack of sympathy for the defend-
ant, it is undisputed that Gonzalez was factually guilty of theft.  Gonza-
lez was not an innocent person who was unreasonably searched; ra-
ther, Gonzalez was a decidedly guilty defendant attempting to use the 
Fourth Amendment as a shield to exclude from consideration the ev-
idence of his misdeed.  Furthermore, there is an acute problem of 
courts routinely producing bad law in the context of Fourth Amend-
ment violations in criminal cases; the remedy for a violation of a de-
fendant’s Fourth Amendment rights is merely suppression at trial of 
the illegally obtained evidence.100  The innocent citizen whose privacy 
rights have been violated by government actors but who is not 
charged with a crime is effectively stuck in an impossible “remedial 
gap”—“left to pay for the government’s constitutional wrong,” the 
victim of a regime that “can in many cases recover from neither the 
[offending] officer nor the government.”101 
The criminal defendant is an “awkward champion” of Fourth 
Amendment rights, who “is self-selected and self-
serving . . . unrepresentative of the larger class of law-abiding citi-
zens.”102  This defendant is “despised by the public, the class he im-
plicitly is supposed to represent,”  and cares “only about exclusion—
and can get only exclusion—even if other remedies (damages or in-
 
 98 Id. at 1051.  The government argued that Gonzalez was, at least for a time, a fugitive, and 
consequently his appeal should have been dismissed pursuant to the fugitive disentitle-
ment doctrine.  Id.  Although the court rejected this argument, it certainly set the stage 
for denial of Gonzalez’s appeal on other grounds. 
 99 Id. at 1050 n.2 (“We share the reader’s dismay that this constitutional question should be 
posed, and that Mr. Gonzalez should have imposed criminal consequences upon himself, 
over $15 worth of spark plugs.”). 
100 See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654-55 (1961) (holding that the exclusionary rule applies 
both in federal and state courts, and that this ruling “close[d] the only courtroom door 
remaining open to evidence secured by official lawlessness in flagrant abuse of that basic 
right, reserved to all persons as a specific guarantee against that very same unlawful con-
duct”). 
101 Akhil Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 812 (1994); see also 
MARC L. MILLER & RONALD F. WRIGHT, CRIMINAL PROCEDURES:  CASES, STATUTES, AND 
EXECUTIVE MATERIALS 425 (3d. Ed. 2007) (discussing the fact that there exist, in theory, 
private remedies for victims of unreasonable searches and seizures, but that these are not 
a “common method of dealing with improper searches or seizures” as the plaintiffs en-
counter large legal obstacles such as sovereign immunity for states and qualified immuni-
ty for state actors). 
102 Amar, supra note 101, at 796. 
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junctions) would better prevent future violations.”103  The exclusion-
ary rule “renders the Fourth Amendment contemptible in the eyes of 
judges and citizens,” and consequently, judges “distort doctrine, 
claiming the Fourth Amendment was not really violated.”104  This was 
precisely the case in Gonzalez—an unsavory defendant caused the cre-
ation of yet another example of bad law in the Fourth Amendment 
arena. 
As if Gonzalez being an unsympathetic defendant were not 
enough to produce this aberrant result, his counsel was so inadequate 
in representing him that it likely rose to the level of ineffective assis-
tance of counsel.105  Despite the fact that Gonzalez was argued before a 
panel of the Ninth Circuit in October of 2001, Gonzalez’s public de-
fender failed to cite any of the aforementioned dispositive cases:  
Chandler, Edmond, Ferguson.106  Had this lawyer made arguments based 
on the changes evident in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence regard-
ing suspicionless searches, the Ninth Circuit’s analysis certainly must 
have been different, if not the outcome of the case. 
Had these cases been discussed, the court at the very least would 
have had to grapple with the fact that this search was in no way relat-
ed to public safety—as was admitted by the government107—in tension 
with Chandler.  It would have been forced to explain a holding that 
contradicted Edmond, which explicitly declared unconstitutional any 
suspicionless searches that are for the primary purpose of gathering 
“evidence of violations of the penal law.”108  The government uncon-
trovertibly admitted that the search program discussed in Gonzalez was 
designed to elicit evidence of violations of the penal laws.109  And fi-
nally, the court would have had to deal with the fact that the store de-
tective who accosted Gonzalez was a law enforcement officer; as Fergu-
son made clear, a principle reason for finding the drug testing of 
 
103 Id. 
104 Id. at 799 (“If exclusion is the remedy, all too often ordinary people will want to say that 
the [Fourth Amendment] right was not really violated.  At first they will say it with a wink; 
later, with a frown; and one day, they will come to believe it.”). 
105 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (describing the two-pronged standard 
for adjudicating whether counsel for a defendant is inadequate; the first prong is whether 
the defendant’s counsel was factually inadequate (cause), and the second prong is 
whether the inadequacy of that counsel prejudiced the defendant’s case (prejudice)). 
106 Each of these cases was decided prior to October of 2001.  Ferguson, the last case in this 
line, was decided on March 21, 2001.  Cf. Part II.C, supra. 
107 Gonzalez, 300 F.3d at 1051(“Based on the government’s concessions . . . [the purpose of 
the search] was to deter and apprehend theft by employees.”). 
108 Edmond, 531 U.S. at 45. 
109 Theft is obviously a violation of the penal law.  Catching and punishing such theft was the 
purpose of the program that resulted in Gonzalez being caught stealing.  As a result of his 
being apprehended, Gonzalez pleaded guilty to larceny, which is a violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 641.  See Gonzalez, 300 F.3d at 1050 n.3. 
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pregnant women unconstitutional was the “entanglement with law 
enforcement.”110  Given these considerations, it is likely that the result 
in Gonzalez would have been markedly different had the defendant 
been even remotely sympathetic or had his counsel been even mini-
mally effective on appeal.  Consequently, the Ninth Circuit’s analysis 
in this case is incorrect and ought to be reexamined.111 
IV.  RECONSIDERATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF EXIT SEARCHES 
In light of the heightened scrutiny now required of suspicionless 
searches based on Supreme Court precedent in Chandler, Edmond, 
and Ferguson, the exit searches as presently carried out are unconsti-
tutional.  Allowing for broad discretion to conduct searches of any 
person departing a government building contravenes the now ex-
tremely limited scope of permissible special needs searches. 
To briefly reiterate the nature of these exit searches: they are 
conducted on every person leaving a building without a warrant, 
probable cause, or even individualized suspicion. They are conducted 
by police officers and, exactly as the government conceded in Gonza-
lez, the only plausible justification for them is apprehension of 
crime—there is no safety interest at stake, whatsoever.  Exit searches 
are performed on both government employees and visitors.  And, 
they are conducted on individuals who have already undergone one 
invasive, suspicionless search—the search required to enter the build-
ing.  Any safety issue, such as a concern that someone might unlaw-
fully possess a gun or explosives, must undoubtedly have already been 
addressed by the previously conducted entry search. 
For suspicionless searches to be unrelated in any way to public 
safety directly contradicts the lessons of Chandler and makes them in-
stantly suspect.  Recall the poignant language from the Chandler deci-
sion:  “But where . . . public safety is not genuinely in jeopardy, the 
Fourth Amendment precludes the suspicionless search, no matter 
how conveniently arranged.”112  Even if these searches are quick, ex-
pedient, necessary to stop theft, or desired by agencies, they cannot 
be found constitutional. 
The exit search regimes further fail Edmond analysis—which pro-
scribes suspicionless searches for the purposes of general crime con-
trol—because they are for the purpose of ferreting out those who 
 
110 Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 79 n.15 (citations omitted). 
111 It is important to note again that Gonzalez’s ineffective counsel failed to petition the Su-
preme Court for certiorari in this case.  Consequently, the Supreme Court has never had 
an opportunity to examine the issue of exit searches specifically. 
112 Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 323 (1997). 
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have stolen items from government buildings and in part for deter-
ring those who might otherwise steal, both law enforcement purpos-
es. 
And to put the proverbial icing on the cake, these searches con-
travene Ferguson, which makes explicit the maxim that if a suspicion-
less search is conducted by law enforcement, it is most likely illegiti-
mate.  Recall also the powerful language from that case:  “In other 
special needs cases, we have tolerated suspension of the Fourth 
Amendment’s warrant or probable cause requirement in part be-
cause there was no law enforcement purpose behind the searches in 
those cases, and there was little, if any, entanglement with law en-
forcement.”113  Every exit search thus far identified is conducted by 
police officers clad in traditional uniforms and armed with a deadly 
weapon.  This systematic search system of thousands of people on a 
daily basis by uniformed police officers looking for mere theft with-
out individualized suspicion cannot pass constitutional muster in 
light of the Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence, and it therefore 
must be seen as an unreasonable infringement on our constitutional-
ly guaranteed rights. 
V.  POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS TO ASSERTIONS OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY 
Several objections naturally follow from this Essay’s assertion that 
exit searches are unconstitutional:  (1) that individuals lack an expec-
tation of privacy when exiting government buildings; (2) that people 
have consented to being exit searched by virtue of their presence in 
government buildings; and (3) that Fourth Amendment rights are 
overridden if an exit search is justified by safety or security interests.  
The first and second objections are considered and rejected, while 
the third objection is accepted as a limited possibility—one that has 
not been identified in any of the presently-known exit search schemes 
affected by the government—which could theoretically be found rea-
sonable under the current Supreme Court jurisprudence. 
A.  Expectation of Privacy 
Analyzing exit searches based on the plurality opinion in O’Connor 
v. Ortega114 might tempt an argument that those who enter govern-
ment buildings have no expectation of privacy in their personal be-
 
113 Ferguson, 532 U.S at 79 n.15. 
114 480 U.S. at 711-729 (1987) (approving the search of the office of a government physician 
by balancing the physician’s expectation of privacy against the government’s interest in 
the efficient operation of the workplace). 
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longings.  Every exit search scheme actually identified is being per-
formed on persons who have already been searched upon entering 
the government building.  Signs are often posted outside of buildings 
where the government has implemented these procedures which in-
form people of the searches ahead of time and allow them to choose 
not to enter the building. By entering these buildings, do individuals 
cede their expectations of privacy until after they have left? 
In O’Connor, the Court held that a government-employed physi-
cian had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office, such that a 
search thereof triggered Fourth Amendment concerns.115  In light of 
that decision, a plurality of the Court then established a two-part test 
for determining whether a workplace search is reasonable:  (1) 
whether an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
thing to be searched, and (2) if so, the individual’s privacy right must 
be balanced against the “government’s need for supervision, control, 
and the efficient operation of the workplace.”116 
Dr. Ortega was found to have a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in at least his desk and file cabinets because he did not share his of-
fice with others and kept personal items out of sight in his desk and 
file cabinets.117  The government interest informing the other side of 
the balancing test was the “efficient and proper operation of the 
workplace.”118  Indeed, the plurality found a special need for searches 
without probable cause in two situations:  “legitimate work-related, 
noninvestigatory intrusions as well as investigations of work-related 
misconduct.”119  However, the Court remanded the case without de-
ciding the ultimate issue because the factual record from the district 
court was incomplete and further proceedings were required to de-
termine the “reasonableness of both the inception of the search and 
its scope” pursuant to the plurality’s announced rules.120 
Even if we were to treat the plurality opinion in O’Connor as a 
holding, there are a number of caveats ensuring that its rules do not 
apply to exit searches.  The first issue is that, by its own terms, 
O’Connor likely does not apply to the closed, personal luggage that is 
the subject of exit searches: 
Not everything that passes through the confines of the business address 
can be considered part of the workplace context, however.  An employee 
 
115 Id. at 718. 
116 Id. at 719-20. 
117 Id. at 718-19; cf. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (“What a person knowing-
ly exposed to the public, even in his home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amend-
ment protection.”). 
118 O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 723. 
119 Id. at 725. 
120 Id. at 729. 
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may bring closed luggage to the office . . . or a handbag or briefcase each 
workday.  While whatever expectation of privacy the employee has in the 
existence and the outward appearance of the luggage is affected by its 
presence in the workplace, the employee’s expectation of privacy in the 
contents of the luggage is not affected in the same way.  The appropriate 
standard for a workplace search does not necessarily apply to a piece of 
closed personal luggage, a handbag, or a briefcase that happens to be 
within the employer’s business address.121 
A person’s expectation of privacy in a closed bag is not diminished 
simply because that bag is brought to work. 
Yet, even assuming, arguendo, that the presence of an exit search 
program diminishes the reasonable expectation of privacy in closed 
personal items on federal property, O’Connor does not constitutional-
ly justify their use.  The hospital administrators in O’Connor had indi-
vidualized suspicion that Ortega had engaged in work-related mis-
conduct;122 by definition, no such suspicion exists with an exit search.  
O’Connor approved a work-related search, “unrelated to illegal con-
duct”;123 an exit search is specifically designed to root out illegal con-
duct, notably theft.124  O’Connor approved searches performed by a ci-
vilian supervisor, specifically stating that the opinion cannot be taken 
to justify searches conducted by law enforcement.125  Exit searches are 
conducted by police officers and therefore O’Connor explicitly disal-
lows them.  And, even if exit searches were hypothetically performed 
by civilians, such as museum employees, the analysis would not 
change; the rule is now clear, based on Chandler, Edmond, and Fergu-
son, that exit searches must be safety-based, and not for the purposes 
of discovering criminal activity. 
B.  Consent 
Another objection may be based upon the principles of consent.126  
Although persons on federal property do not have a diminished ex-
 
121 Id. at 716. 
122 Id. at 726.  Individualized suspicion was discussed in the case and determined to exist, but 
was not a dispositive issue.  Had there been a lack of individualized suspicion, the Court 
would have been compelled to determine whether individualized suspicion is a necessary 
component of reasonableness. 
123 Id. at 721. 
124 See supra, note 107 and accompanying text. 
125 O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 717 (“Individuals do not lose Fourth Amendment rights merely be-
cause they work for the government instead of a private employer. The operational reali-
ties of the workplace, however, may make some employees’ expectations of privacy unrea-
sonable when an intrusion is by a supervisor rather than a law enforcement official.”). 
126 Attempting to debate the merits of what constitutes consent is largely beyond the scope of 
this Essay, as it is a tortured, normative issue that is not easily agreed upon and depends 
largely upon context. 
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pectation of privacy in their personal items,127 it is possible that en-
trance onto federal property constitutes consent to being searched 
and thus prevents the constitutional issue from being reached.  This 
argument is especially salient in the context of exit-searching em-
ployees and independent contractors doing business with the gov-
ernment; these individuals are the most pervasively exit-searched and 
presumably “consent” to being searched as a condition of their em-
ployment.  Moreover, signs are often posted outside of buildings 
where exit searches are performed, notifying those entering that they 
must consent to being searched.  However, there are a number of 
considerations that must be seen as undermining consent in this con-
text, making it suspect, invalid, or unconstitutional. 
1.  Courts Consistently Abandon Consent as an Issue 
The Supreme Court has mentioned in dicta on a number of occa-
sions that a possible cure to an otherwise unconstitutional search is 
consent.128  As discussed earlier, the Fourth Amendment creates a re-
gime where choice reigns supreme—individuals have the right to 
choose what things to keep hidden from public view and what things 
to reveal.129  Yet, in every case where the Court has adjudicated the 
constitutionality of a special needs search,130 consent has dropped out 
as an issue altogether.  Every single case could effectively be recatego-
rized as one in which the aggrieved party consented.  In Martinez-
Fuerte, for example, driving through a fixed checkpoint—or even driv-
ing near an international border—could be seen as consenting to a 
search.  Engaging in high school athletics, as in Acton, could be recast 
as a consent issue.  Working for the government, as in O’Connor, 
could be seen as tacit consent to a search, especially if an employee 
signed a paper authorizing a search or if warning signs were posted 
notifying employees of the possibility of being searched.  No doubt 
the drug testing of pregnant women at a hospital, as in Ferguson, 
could be seen as consensual.131 
Yet, the Court has consistently refused to analyze these cases in 
terms of consent, ignoring the consent issue altogether, or “necessari-
 
127 See Part V.A, supra. 
128 See, e.g., Camara v. Mun. Ct., 387 U.S. 523, 528-29 (1967) (“[E]xcept in certain carefully 
defined classes of cases, a search of private property without proper consent is ‘unreasona-
ble’ unless it has been authorized by a valid search warrant.”) (emphasis added). 
129 See Part II, supra. 
130 See generally Parts II.B & II.C, supra. 
131 See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 93 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (lamenting the majority opinion in part 
because he believed that the taking of the urine specimens was consensual and therefore 
constitutional). 
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ly assum[ing]” that searches were conducted without informed con-
sent.132  This is notwithstanding the fact that it is the policy of the 
Court to decide cases on nonconstitutional grounds when possible, 
avoiding the constitutional issue unless absolutely necessary to decide 
a case.133  This proves that the consent issue in these cases must have 
been affirmatively ignored, rather than merely “not reached,” be-
cause any of these cases could have been cast aside on the narrow is-
sue of consent without reaching a constitutional holding. 
This glaring rejection of consent arguments also extends to gov-
ernment workers, despite the pervasiveness of consent as a defense by 
private employers to defeat employee lawsuits in other contexts.134  In 
Gonzalez, the only case that discusses exit searches specifically, consent 
was also largely ignored by the Court,135 despite the admission by the 
appellant that he “understood ‘that employees were required to allow 
such searches’ because he had signed something when he started 
work so indicating.”136  Consent was even summarily discarded as an 
issue in City of Ontario v. Quon, the only other case in which the Su-
preme Court again grappled with the issues decided by the plurality 
in O’Connor, a case in which consent was more than palpable.137  Con-
sequently, it is unclear that consent is even a serious consideration at 
all in cases of special needs searches, as courts uniformly ignore any 
inkling of consent and reach the constitutional issue—even when 
consent is assuredly manifest. 
 
132 Id. at 76, 93. 
133 See, e.g., Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Eng’g, 467 U.S. 138, 157 (1984) (“It is a funda-
mental rule of judicial restraint, however, that this Court will not reach constitutional 
questions in advance of the necessity of deciding them.”). 
134 See, e.g., Feminist Women’s Health Ctr. v. Sup. Ct., 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 187 (Ct. App. 1997) 
(rejecting a former employee’s claims of invasion of privacy and wrongful discharge de-
spite having been required by her employer to disrobe and display her vagina as a condi-
tion of employment, based on the fact that the employee had consented). 
135 United States v. Gonzales, 300 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2002) (“We do not reach the is-
sue of whether Mr. Gonzalez consented to the search . . . .”). 
136 Id. at 1050.  If this did not constitute consent, virtually no action could logically be con-
ceived as consensual in these cases. 
137 City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S.Ct. 2619 (2010).  In this case, the Court approved the le-
gitimate “noninvestigatory, work-related” search of an employee’s cell phone, which 
turned up evidence of the sending of sexually explicit messages by Sgt. Quon to his mis-
tress during work hours.  Id. at 2626, 2628.  Despite the fact that the city owned the cell 
phone Quon was using, that Quon had signed a computer consent policy giving the city 
the ability to monitor employees’ e-mail and internet use, and that the city explicitly 
warned Quon that text messages would be treated the same as e-mails for the purpose of 
monitoring, the Court all but ignored the obvious consent issue and went on to decide 
whether the search was constitutionaly valid in light of O’Connor.  Id. at 2625. 
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2.  Consent Is Coerced 
Despite this analysis, if consent remains a consideration in cases of 
suspicionless special needs searches, any consent given should be 
seen as invalid because it is necessarily coerced.  One clear reason for 
this assertion is that the subject of an exit search may not withdraw 
his consent to be searched.138  If a person could withdraw consent to 
be exit-searched, that would effectively eviscerate all of its purposes—
deterring and discovering theft.  Anyone who did not wish to be 
searched, whether stealing or not, could merely refuse the search.  
But if there is no meaningful choice in the matter, then the subject is 
necessarily being coerced at the time of the search.139  Coercion de-
stroys consent, and without consent, the analysis must return to 
Fourth Amendment reasonableness; and we now know that exit 
searches are unreasonable standing alone. 
3.  Requiring Consent to Be Searched Violates the Unconstitutional 
Conditions Doctrine 
Even if one were able to overcome the coercion hurdle and argue 
that consent given to be searched is valid, exit searches still remain 
unconstitutional.  For the government to condition a benefit upon 
giving up one’s constitutional rights is itself violative of the Constitu-
tion—it contravenes the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions.140  
The unconstitutional conditions doctrine is the “principle that the 
government cannot condition a benefit on the requirement that a 
person forgo a constitutional right.”141  Thus, the “government may 
not deny a benefit to a person because he exercises a constitutional 
right.”142  “Unconstitutional conditions problems arise when the gov-
ernment offers a benefit on condition that the recipient perform or 
forego an activity that a preferred constitutional right normally pro-
 
138 See Part I, supra. 
139 The concept of coercion is not limited to a lack of meaningful choice, but has often been 
defined as something less strict.  See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 583 
(1968) (“A procedure need not be inherently coercive in order that it be held to impose 
an impermissible burden upon the assertion of a constitutional right.”). 
140 For the seminal work on unconstitutional conditions, see Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconsti-
tutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413 (1988) (describing the definition of the un-
constitutional conditions doctrine, its importance as a tool in correcting and deterring 
suppression of constitutional rights by the government, and its uneven application by the 
Supreme Court). 
141 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:  PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES, 980 (2006). 
142 Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540, 545 (1997); (citing 
Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972)). 
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tects from government interference.”143  In the exit search context, 
the government requires an individual to surrender Fourth Amend-
ment rights in order to utilize its property and gain any appurtenant 
benefits. 
This doctrine applies equally to employees of the federal govern-
ment and visitors to its properties.  Entering government property 
confers a benefit on those who choose to do so.  Employees enjoy the 
benefits of employment, including compensation; the benefit for visi-
tors consists of whatever reason induced them to enter the build-
ing.144  Nor are the benefits offered by the government a mere gratui-
ty—government benefits are the “new property” of individuals.145 
The problem here is not that privacy may not generally be alien-
ated to other private persons:  “unconstitutional conditions cases ask 
not whether liberties are alienable generally, but only whether gov-
ernment may induce their surrender.”146  The exercise of an unconsti-
tutional condition allows the government to achieve an end-run 
around rights, which it would not be able to do if it did not offer a 
benefit.  Allowing for unconstitutional conditions destroys private or-
dering,147 diminishes the evenhandedness of government,148 and cre-
ates a constitutional caste system.149 
The problem with the unconstitutional conditions doctrine is 
that, though it has existed for a century, it is unevenly applied by the 
 
143 Sullivan, supra note 140, at 1421-22. 
144 For example, visitors benefit from access to the extensive research materials available at 
the Library of Congress.  See History, Library of Congress, http://www.loc.gov/about/
history.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2012) (noting that the Library collection contains more 
than 155 million items). 
145 See generally Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964); see also Charles A. 
Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare:  The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245, 
1255 (“Many of the most important . . . entitlements now flow from govern-
ment . . . [s]uch sources of security, whether private or public, are no longer regarded as 
luxuries or gratuities; to the recipients they are essentials, fully deserved, and in no sense 
a form of charity.”); cf. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261-62 (1970) (regarding with ap-
proval and accepting Reich’s views on government benefits, and finding actual property 
rights in one of the most seemingly obvious government “gratuities”—welfare benefits). 
146 Sullivan, supra note 140, at 1489-90. 
147 Id. at 1492 (“Government may not directly command or forbid actions protected by indi-
vidual rights of speech, association, or reproductive privacy, for example, because these 
decisions belong in the realm of private ordering rather than government control.”). 
148 Id. at 1496 (“Unconstitutional conditions inherently classify potential beneficiaries into 
two groups:  those who comply with the condition . . . and those who do not.”).  Because 
entry into a government building and the attendant benefits provided thereby are condi-
tioned on submission to an exit search, those who choose not to give up their Fourth 
Amendment rights are necessarily excluded from the benefits. 
149 Id. at 1497-98.  Those who, for example, do not as readily need government benefits may 
preserve their constitutional liberties, while those who most need benefits, perhaps the 
indigent, must give up their constitutional rights in order to obtain the benefit. 
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Supreme Court.  In many cases, the Court will strike down a govern-
ment condition based on finding it to be an unconstitutional condi-
tion,150 but in other cases, it will uphold laws that look identical to 
those with unconstitutional conditions problems.151  Consequently, 
this uncertainty makes it difficult to predict which treatment or out-
come any particular case will receive. 
One possible answer to this quandary is the germaneness of the 
condition to the benefit:  the more germane a condition is to a bene-
fit, the more deferential the review a court will conduct.152  The less 
germane, the more the condition looks coercive, like “extortion, 
bribery, manipulation, and subterfuge.”153  Thus, for example, condi-
tioning welfare benefits on residence in a state is highly attenuated, 
but refusing to subsidize discussions of abortions in federally funded 
family planning clinics is more germane. 
Conditioning the entry to a government building upon being exit-
searched clearly creates an unconstitutional condition—individuals 
are required to relinquish their Fourth Amendment rights in order to 
obtain the benefits of entry.  And, the ability to come to work every 
day in a military commissary or to read books in the Library of Con-
gress is exceedingly irrelevant to the government interest in exit-
searching a person.  With no safety interest at stake in an exit search, 
the required nexus between the benefit and the search is minimal 
and most probably nonexistent.  When the true definition of and 
purposes behind exit searches come to light, these searches increas-
ingly resemble manipulation—if a person wants a benefit the gov-
ernment provides in its buildings then they ought to be prepared to 
surrender their constitutional privacy rights.  This practice plainly vi-
olates the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. 
C.  A Safety-Based Exit Search 
Finally, there remains the possibility that certain discrete, hypo-
thetical exit searches could be constitutionally justified by legitimate 
safety concerns.  If safety-based, an exit search bears greater resem-
 
150 See e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630-31 (1969) (holding that denying welfare 
benefits to an individual who has lived in a state for less than a year impermissibly bur-
dens, among other rights, the fundamental right to interstate travel); Legal Servs. Corp. v. 
Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 549-50 (2001) (invalidating a statute that prevented lawyers re-
ceiving funding from the Legal Services Corporation from making certain arguments on 
their clients’ behalves). 
151 See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 179 (1991) (upholding a law that prohibited 
“counseling concerning the use of abortion as a method of family planning” for family-
planning organizations that receive federal funding). 
152 See Sullivan, supra note 140, at 1457. 
153 Id. at 1456-57.  See pages 1456-68 for a full explication of the germaneness issue. 
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blance to an entry search and contains far fewer of the problematic 
hallmarks that this Essay has thus far described.154  Indeed, if some ex-
it search scheme were genuinely safety-based, it would likely pass con-
stitutional muster.  Some examples that could epitomize a constitu-
tional exit search might be searches conducted on engineers leaving 
a nuclear power plant or National Security Agency (NSA) employees 
privy to documents containing classified national-security infor-
mation as they leave the NSA facility.155 
However, my contention concerning exit searches is that they are 
unconstitutional as observed in practice.  The regulations authorizing 
their promulgation are exceedingly broad, giving limitless discretion 
to agencies to create and implement exit search schemes.156  And 
those exit searches admittedly have nothing to do with safety con-
cerns; they are genuinely for the law enforcement purpose of theft 
apprehension and not an inkling more.  Some exit searches could be 
constitutional, but this analysis shows that no exit search thus far 
identified is constitutional. 
CONCLUSION 
Exit searches, as currently implemented by our government, are 
patently unconstitutional.  Pursuant to broad, discretion-less regula-
tions, administrators of public buildings have been given license to 
implement these search schemes without any oversight.  Day-in and 
day-out, these searches impinge on our Fourth Amendment rights to 
be free of the strictures of a government arbitrarily and unreasonably 
destroying the privacy we are due as autonomous beings.  These 
searches undermine liberty while carrying vast potential for abuse. 
 At one time, the Supreme Court might have approved of these 
searches, when it openly deferred to legislatures and executives in 
their assertions of “special needs” justifying this or that suspicionless 
search.  Perhaps realizing the unintended consequences of this open-
ended jurisprudence, the Court has, over the past two decades, seri-
ously curtailed the ability of the government to make these unjustifi-
able searches a reality.  In contrast with the now-abandoned defer-
ence, the heightened scrutiny of today’s Court requires a specifically 
 
154 Compare this with the justification for entry searches presented in McMorris v. Alioto, 567 
F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1978), which was the prevention of serious harm to government build-
ings by subversive individuals looking to detonate explosives. 
155 This list is far from exhaustive.  Given the intentional lack of clarity surrounding the na-
ture of government occupations related to important security concerns, it is impossible to 
compile an exhaustive list—hypothetical safety-based searches such as these require a 
case-by-case reasonableness determination under the Fourth Amendment. 
156 See 41 C.F.R. § 102-74.370 (2011). 
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articulable safety interest to search without suspicion and mandates 
that these searches not be for the purpose of ferreting out violations 
of the penal laws nor entangled with law enforcement officers.  The 
exit searches being carried out daily violate all three of these condi-
tions and consequently, cannot be seen as constitutional. 
 Any objections attempting to preserve the constitutionality of exit 
searches despite the Supreme Court’s contraction of the special 
needs exception must fail.  Individuals do not forfeit their expecta-
tion of privacy in closed personal items merely because they work for 
our government or wish to receive a benefit from access to its proper-
ties.  Any nominal consent to an exit search is most certainly coerced, 
making it suspect and invalid.  And, even if consent to an exit search 
could be shown to be a valid waiver of privacy, allowing the govern-
ment to condition a benefit on the surrender of constitutional 
rights—which it could not require if it did not offer the benefit—
violates the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.  Violations such as 
these unfortunately make our government appear more like an un-
scrupulous rights-trader in the business of achieving an illicit goal 
than a defender of liberty.  This behavior is incompatible with our 
Constitution. 
 This is not to say that certain hypothetical safety-based exit 
searches could not be constitutional, but only that the exit searches 
presently effectuated buckle under serious legal examination.  Con-
sequently, courts should heavily scrutinize exit searches and, finding 
them unconstitutional, return to us the rights that are presently being 
abrogated without justification. 
